Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1955

John E. McNaughton and Henrietta McNaughton
v. John B. Eaton et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Edward W. Clyde; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McNaughton v. Eaton, No. 8277 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2299

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

RECEIVED
APR 1 3

=============================

1956

AW l!WAM
U. of U.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

l; 1 -L l~~ 1)
JOHN E. McNAUGHTON and HENt\~ 1 :;, -~__;. <~)
RIETTA McNAUGHTON, his wife,
'· -- ·-'
.Appellants and Plalintifls,Llerk.
~--- --_
-c-~~~--·-u:ili
. pr..;:,:.(]'!•r;.:: •· 0 - .... .,
-vs.JOHN B. EATON, an unmarried
man; MYRTLE ROSS; JAMES H.
FISHER and CUN A FISHER,
Case No.
husband and wife; RICE COOPER
8277
and EDITH R. LAWRENCE
COOPER, husband and wife; W. S.
ROSS; and FERN ROSS FAWCETT; JACK TURNER and
MARIE TURNER, his wife, and
MYRON PERRY,
.Appellees and Defendoots.
R

--••IIIC~Y..J

Brief of Appellants
EDWARD W. CLYDE

.Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

INDEX

Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT---------------------------------------------------------------- 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS.·----------------------·······-···················-···········----······- 3
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL .............................................. 4
I. The court erred in fixing a definite time schedule for
the use of water by plaintiffs and appellants.......................... 4
II. The court erred in limiting appellants to two cubic feet
of water per second and enjoining them from using
more than said quantity of water at any time...................... 5
III. That the court erred in limiting the irrigation season
to 150 days and in prohibiting any use of water after
September 22nd ················-·-···-···········-···-··········--·····--··········-······· 5
IV. That the court erred in entering any injunction against
plaintiffs and appellants.............................................................. 5
V. The court erred in requiring the appellants to construct
appropriate by-pass facilities at their expense...................... 5
VI. The court erred in failing and refusing to place any
time limits or to fix the duty, or in other wise determine and define the rights of the defendants and in
refusing to enjoin them from using water in excess of
their rights ·········-················----------·--··-·-····························-··········· 5
VII. The court erred in fixing the duty of water at 3.5 acre
feet per acre.................................................................................... 5
VIII. The court erred in refusing to enter paragraph 9 of the
proposed decree ............................................................................ 5
IX. The court erred in refusing to enter proposed Finding
of Fact No. 16 to the effect that the Supreme Court had
determined that there were five classes of water reaching MeN aughton Gulch, two of which were MeN a ughton's private waters, and that MeN aughton can use the
MeN aughton Gulch as a part of his lateral or irrigating
system and can divert and recapture his water in the
MeN aughton Gulch. --····--··········-····························---------········---- 5
X. The court erred in refusing to adjudge by its decree
that none of the defendants has any interest in MeN aughton's canal stock, and that he can use the same
at such times as he desires without regard to the
defendants ---------------·····-····················-·····················-······················ 6
ARGUMENT ------------------------···---------·······------------------·-·····-··----····················· 6
Point I ·------------------·-·······-----------··--·--········--·········--·····················--······-··· 6
Point II ···-········---··············-····-··········-···-·················-----------------········-··--- 7
Point III ----------------------······-·········---·································-····················---· 12
Point IV ····--···························································································· 16
Point V ································-······································----------------·--····---- 26
Utah Cases ---------------------------------------------------------------------------··----·-· 28
Point VI ------------------·····-·······················-························-······-------············ 39
Point VII ----------·--------------------------------····--·-···--·--·-····-··--·-----····-···············- 40
SUl\iMARY -----------------·······--·-·················-·-···················································· 41

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-( Continued)
TEXTS CITED

Page

43 C.J .S. 424--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·····-····-··- 17
Storey's Equity Juris prudence, 1233 ... -------------·--···-····-··----------·---·-····-····--· 17
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights .......... ---···---------------------------------- 26
Wiel, "Water Rights in the Western States"----------------------------------------·· 26

CASES CITED
Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Company v. Cook, 73 Utah 383,
27 4 p. 47 4----------------------------------------------------------------------·--------······-------·-·- 28
Dameron Valley Reservoir and Canal Company v. Bleak, 61
Utah 230, 211 P. 974 .... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 19
Deseret Livestock Co. v. Howells Livestock Co., 259 P. 2d 607 .......... 24
Gray v. DeFay, 107 Utah 172, 153 P. 2d 544..... -------------------------------·-······

6

Hudson v. Dailey, 105 Pac. 784·----------------------------------------------------,-------------- 20
Jackson v. Spanish Fork & West Field Irrigation Company, 223
p. 2d 827··-····------···------------------------·------------------------------.-----------··-·----------- 28
Jacobs'v. American Bank & Trust Company, 68 P. 2d 801 (Okla.) .... 20
Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356, 289 Pac. 1097------------------ 28
King County v. Port of Seattle, 103 P. 2d 834, (Wash.) ________________________ 20
McGregor v. Mining Company, 14 Utah 47.... ------------------------------------·-·- 18
Old Telegraph Mining Company v. The Central Cement Company, 1 Utah 331·----------------------------------------------------------------···----------·····- 18
Powerine Company v. Zions Savings Bank & Trust Company, et
al., 106 Utah 384, 148 P. 2d 807.·--··-------------········---------······-------··------- 6
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water and Electric Power
Company, 25 Utah 457, 71 P. 1069·-----------------------·-------------·---··········· 18
Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 Pac. 273 .... ·-------·-····------------------29, 33
Stauffer v. Ut3:h Oil Refining Company, 85 Utah 388. ......................... 19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN E. McNAUGHTON and HEN- \
RIETTA McNAUGHTON, his wife,
Appellants and Plaintiffs,
-vs.JOHN B. EATON, an unmarried
man; MYRTLE ROSS; JAMES H.
FISHER and CUN A FISHER,
husband and wife; RICE COOPER
and EDITH R. LAWRENCE
COOPER, husband and wife; W. S.
ROSS; and FERN ROSS FAWCETT; JACK TURNER and
MARIE TURNER, his wife, and
MYRON PERRY,
.Appellees and Defendants.

Case No.
8277

Brief of Appellants
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
John E. McNaughton and his wife, appellants here,
originally brought this action to quiet title to the waters
of MeN a ugh ton Gulch. The defendants answered, claiming that they were the owners of all the waters arising
1
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in l\ticNaughton Gulch and denying that the plaintiffs had
any interest therein. At the original trial the court
awarded the water to the plaintiffs, but erroneously based
its judgment on the theory that the waters were private
waters not subject to the law of appropriation. The trial
court found, however, that if the waters were subject to
the doctrine of appropriation, plaintiffs were the senior
appropriators with rights superior to the rights of any
of the defendants. The defendants appealed. This court
on the original appeal reversed the trial court's holding
that the waters were private waters, but affirmed the
trial court in its determination that the plaintiffs were
the senior appropriators. The Supreme Court's prior
opinion is reported in 242 P. 2d 570.
The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with its opinion.
A further hearing was had. The trial court again held
that the plaintiffs were the senior appropriators, fixed
the duty of water at 3.5 acre feet of water per year, and
then placed various restrictions on plaintiffs' right to
use the water and entered an injunction against the
plaintiffs. The nature of these restrictions and of the
injunction can best be detailed in connection with the
Statement of Facts and Argument, but it is because of
these restrictions and the injunction that McNaughtons
have now appealed. Suffice it to note here that the court
order has taken from the plaintiffs nearly 80% of the
water they have historically used.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
From the trial court's findings and the determination
of the Supreme Court, we consider the following facts to
be established. McNaughton Gulch is a natural waterway formed by water erosion from natural sources. The
gulch varies from three to five rods in width and from
five to fifteen feet in depth with steep banks on either
side. The surrounding country is nearly flat with a
gradual slope toward the gulch and generally to the
south and east. The defendants' lands are all located
below the plaintiffs' lands in the east half of the same
section. (See Supreme Court's opinion.)
Historically the plaintiffs have diverted the gulch
waters by a number of dams. The highest one is about
a quarter of a mile upstream from plaintiffs' land and
the water is conveyed on to their land below by means of
a ditch. The lowest dam is on the boundary line between
plaintiffs' two forty acre tracts and only a little more
than a quarter of a mile downstream from their west
boundary line.
The Supreme Court noted that the waters accumulating in the gulch reached the gulch by five different
means, to wit: (1) Waters which drain into the gulch
from natural sources; (2) Canal surplus and waste
waters turned into the gulch merely to get rid of them;
{3) Canal waters used to irrigate lands on both sides of
the gulch which drain into it above the plaintiffs' lands;
3
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( 4) Canal waters used to irrigate the plaintiffs' lands
by draining into the gulch above the plaintiffs' lowest
dam; (5) Canal "\Vaters tu~"ned into the gulch to be used
by them to irrigate their lands.
The Supreme Court then went on to note that:
''The first three of the above divisions are
subject to appropriation either as the waters of
a natural stream or waters which have been once
appropriated but allo,ved to drain into a natura]
water course beyond the control of the original
appropriator. The last two divisions are not subject to appropriation because they are still in the
possession of the plaintiffs who have the right to
use them under the original appropriation. The
trial court correctly held that plaintiffs have the
prior right to use all of these waters because as
to the first three divisions they had first appropriated them to a beneficial use before 1903 when no
application to appropriate was necessary, but the
court erred in holding that plaintiffs' rights to
the use of these waters are not subject to reasonable regulation and control in the saving of
water."
Since this appeal is taken because of the regulations
and controls placed on plaintiffs, the facts which are
material to the regulation are specifically set out as a
part of the argument.
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
I. The Court erred in fixing a definite time schedule
for the use of water by plaintiffs and appellants.
4
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II. The Court erred in limiting appellants to t"ro
cubic feet of water per second and enjoining them from
utilizing more than said quantity of water at any time.
III. That the court erred in lim.iting the irrigation
season to 150 days and in prohibiting any use of water
after September 22nd.
IV. That the court erred in entering any InJunction against plaintiffs and appellants.
V. The court erred in requiring the appellants to
construct appropriate by-pass facilities at their expense.

VI. The court erred in failing and refusing to place
any time limits or to fix the duty, or in other "\vise determine and define the r~ghts of the defendants and in refusing to enjoin them from using water in excess of their
rights.
VII. The court erred in fixing the duty of \vater at
3.5 acre feet per acre.
VIII. The court erred 1n refusing to enter paragraph 9 of the proposed decree.
IX. The court erred in refusing to enter proposed
Finding of Fact No. 16 to the effect that the Supreme
Court had determined that there were five classes of
water reaching MeN a ugh ton Gulch, two of which were
McNaughton's private waters, and that McNaughton can
use the McNaughton Gulch as a part of his lateral or

5
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irrigating system and can divert and recapture his water
in the McNaughton Gulch.
X. The court erred in refusing to adjudge by its
decree that none of the defendants has any interest in
McNaughton's canal stock, and that he can use the same
at such times as he desires without regard to the defendants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
COURT ON THE ORIGINAL APPEAL ARE THE
LAW OF THE CASE.
We think it 'veil at the outset to note that such matters as this court determined on its piror appeal have
become the law of the case, binding on the parties, the
trial court and the Supreme Court, and are not now subject to reexamination. This court has so held on numerous occasions. 1
The Supreme Court has expressly held that appellants here are the senior appropriators with rights superior to the rights of any of the defendants ; that they
See, for example, Powerine Company v. Zions Savings Bank &
Trust Company, et al., 106 Utah 384, 148 P. 2d 807, and Gray v. DeFay,
107 Utah 172, 153 P. 2d 544. In the Powerine case on a second appeal
the Supreme Court said:
"We shall not review our pronouncements heretofore made in
this case, nor shall we discuss the errors assigned if they deal with
matters discussed in the previous opinion and upon which no new
determination should have been made by the trial court, except by
way of entering findings to confonn to our previous opinion. * * *
"Our pronouncements are the law of the case, binding no less
upon us than on the lower court. We, therefore, shall not review
them."
1

6
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used the water prior to 1903 about as they now use it,
and that the trial court's findings in regard to appellants'
prior appropriation should be affirmed. The trial court
in its Memorandum Decision (R. 36) also applied this
principle and upon that theory re-entered verbatim its
Findings Nos. 1-9, included in which are many of the
critical facts which will control this appeal.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING A
DEFINITE TIME SCHEDULE FOR THE USE
OF WATER BY PLAINTIFFS AND IN LIMITING PLAINTIFFS TO 2 C.F.S. OF WATER
DURING SAID PERIOD.
The trial court noted in its original findings, (R. 11)
and in its findings entered after the retrial, (R. 70) that
the amount of water finding its way into the MeN a ugh ton
Gulch ''varies from day to day and from season to season, depending upon the irrigation practices prevailing
on these adjacent lands; that the amount of water available for diversion from the gulch on to the MeN aughton
lands is not measurable* * * (Finding 6) that the volume
of seepage or waste water flowing into the McNaughton
Gulch has increased with the increase of irrigation within
its drainage area, until at the high point of flow there
may be several cubic feet per second flowing into the
gulch, but the flow is not constant and the amount at its
lowest ebb is of a negligible amount."
This finding as to the variable flow from day to day
and from season to season was challenged by the de7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendants in their :fi~st appeal, but the finding was not
disturbed by the Supreme Court. Even had these findings
not become the la\v of the cases, the evidence 'vould
compel the conclusion that the stream has a variable
flov1; that when upstream irrigators are wasteful in the
application of "\IVa ter the flow of water in the gulch is
high, and when they are careful in their irrigation practices the flow may be of negligible amount.
In almost the exact words of this trial court's findings, Carroll testified at pages 53 and 55 that t~e v".. ater
is not measurable. He also testified at page 52, as follows:
'' Q. Is the amount which flovvs therein consistent from day to day, and season~

A. Varies all the time.
Q. Does it vary day to day in the same

season~

A. Yes, because we have irrigation on each
side, and sometimes the \Vaste "\Vater runs in and
it will raise, and the next day somebody shuts their
vvrater off and there \VOn 't be as much in there.
Q. Do the upper irrigators permit their waste
"\Vater to run into the gulch~
\
.1.1...

John

y es, sir.
. ''

~feN aughton

testified (R. 158) as follows:
I

"Well, I have observed the gulch for all these
years, and I find that the gulch fluctuates from
year to year and day to day, and it is pretty hard
to tell just ho\v much water you are going to
have * * *

'

Q. Do you know what causes it to fluctuate
from day to day~
8
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.1:\. It is caused by the amount of irrigation on
each side of the gulch; that is one of the causes .
..:\.nd, of course, from the use of the water by the
neighbors above. Sometimes they are not so careful about their \Vater, they let it run through and
return \Yaste water, so the gulch fluctuates fron1
" . . aste v. . ater as " . . ell as the seepage "rater.''

The fact that the stream is variable is of critical
importance. The trial court in its decree fixed the duty
of \Vater at 3.5 acre feet of \Yater per acre per year, and
on the basis of 66.03 acres being irrigated the court
R\varded plaintiff 231.05 acre feet of water each year, (R.
74). Hovvever, the court restricted the plaintiff to diversions from the 1\IcNa ugh ton Gulch of not more than t\tvo
cubic feet of \Vater per second during an exact 92 hour
2-± minute period during each ten consecutive days. If
there \vere ahvays two cubic feet of \Yater per second or
more in the gulch during the particular 92 hour 24 rninute
period \vhen the plaintiffs are permitted by the decree
to use water, they \vould be able to get exactly 3.5 acrP

feet of \Vater per acre, or 231.05 acre feet per year. If,
ho\vever, at any time during their 92 hour turn the gulch
should yield less than 2 c.f.s. of water, they would not be
able to get the \Vater \vhich the trial court and this court
have adjudged that they appropriated. Since the court
has found and it is the lavv of the ease that the stream
varies from day to day and from season to season, and
the flow is at times of negligible amount, it \vas error to
put the plaintiffs on such a restricted basis \vithout provision to protect their rights against the variable flo". .
9
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so t:Q.at they would in any event be permitted to take the
231 acre feet awarded to them.
Historically the plaintiffs have 11sed the water a.s it
accumulated at their points of diversion, taking such
quantities as were available. Every witness testifying
on the subject admitted that for over half a century
~1cN a ugh ton has maintained a tight dam across the McNaughton Gulch abov~ the points of diversion used by
the defendants, (R. 12, 15, 19, 63, 73, 100, 140). There
was undisputed evidence to the effect that from 1900 to
1948 there was no complaint from anyone and no trouble
on the stream, (R. 183). Even the predecessors in interest to the defendants so admitted. Ed Hoeft, predecessor
in interest to one of the defendants testified that from
1909 until he sold the property he had never had any
occasion to disturb the McNaughton Dam, (R. 102).
Ernest J o"hnson, \vho owned part of the defendants' lands
said that he never bothered to walk upstream during the
time he farmed the lands (R. 125). Mr. Ross, who was
a predecessor in interest to some of the defendants, was
ou the stream for 48 years, and he never once had occasion to go upstream to the l\1:cNaughton farm (R. 33).
John B. Eaton has farm.ed some of defendant's property
for 35 years, and he never during all of that time had
occasion to go to the MeN a ughton property until 1948
when this trouble started, (R. 353).
It thus seems undisputably established that for half
a century McNaughton has maintained tight dams across
McNaughton Gulch, diverting the water accumulating
therein on to his lands and done of the defendants or their

10
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predecessors interfered until1948. In 1947 the lVlcN a ughton Dam "\Yas "rashed out, (R. 375). McNaughton replaced
it in 1948, (R. 171). When the dam was replaced the
'vater 'vas shut off. Fisher, who had just become an
owner of land on the gulch (R. 275) missed the water
and 'vent upstream to find it, ( R. 27 6, 293). He sa 'v the
dams and ditches of McNaughton. The dam had been
recently replaced, and the ditches had been cleared.
Fisher thought the dam and ditches were new construction ( R. 281, 287). He took his shovel and diverted the
"\Vater out of the l\icN aughton ditches, (R. 294) and then
had MeN a ugh ton arrested. This precipitated the filing
of this la,vsuit, in which the trial court and the Supreme
Court have both held that MeN a ugh ton's right is prior
to the rights of any of the defendants.
It is clear from the evidence that McNaughton's
ditches are large enough to take more than six c.f.s. of
"\Vater at the same time, (Retrial R. 26). Even though ~le
Na ughton has diverted all of the water which has accumulated in the gulch, he has found it necessary to divert
water from the Ashley Canal, in which he owns stock,
and supplement the gulch water with it, (R. 29, 221, 101,
152). Since the stream varies even within the same day
because of the practices of upstream irrigators, it is
difficult for McNaughton to know when the water 'vill
be in the gulch and how much ·\vater he 'vill have at any
given time, (R. 158).

IS

McNaughtons' land sloped to the gulch and there
a drain ditch along the entire lo,ver (east) end of

11
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the ~leN a ugh ton laud, (R. Ex. 1, Ex. A, 261, 262, Finding 10). If the tight dam under any particular circumstance should diYert surplus \Vater on to l\lcN a ugh tons'
lands it "\vould return directly to the gulch. There is no
place else it could go and both the drain ditch and the
points at \vhich the \Yater \Vould run on the surface to
the gulch are upstream from all the defendants' lands.
On a variable, unmeasureable stream, the manner in
\vhich the parties peaceably functioned all these years
is probably the best method of handling the administration of the stream.
In any event, the prior or senior right of ~feN a ughtons to take the water needed by his lands is totally
defeated \Yhere on a variable stream the court limits him
to a rigid schedule of hours and a maximum rate of flow
as "\vas done here. It assumes a constant :flo\v of more
than 2 c.f.s. If at any time during his 92 hour turn the
flow is less than 2 c.f.s. he will not get his "~ater. The
court has found that the flo\v is variable and at times is
negligible. In the face of this finding the rigid schedule
of hours and the 2 c.f.s. limit cannot stand.

POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN LilMITING
THE IRRIGATON SEASON TO 150 DAYS.
The discussion under Point III is really inter-related
'vith the discussions under Points IV and V, "~hich relate
to the issuance of an injunction against the plaintiffs
and the fixing of a duty as low a.s 3.5 acre feet. We 'viii
refer here only to the basis of the court's order, and will

12
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then relate the matter to the argument under Points IV
and V.
In its originall\iemorandum Decision the court fixed
the duty of 'vater at 3.5 acre feet per acre per year, and
the irrigation season at 180 days, ( R. 51). The court
had also made a mathematical error in its computation,
and :NicNaughtons filed a motion for correction of the
error and for reconsideration, (R. 53). The l\IcNaughtons
had called David I. Gardner, an engineer, as an expert
on the duty of "\Yater. Mr. Gardner testified that in his
opinion a 180 day irrigation season was desirable in the
\Ternal area, (Retrial 84). He noted that the McNaughton land was uneven and that irrigation of the high spots
\Vould require an excess application of water in the
swales. He also noted various other criteria which affect
the duty of water, and expressed his opinion that six
acre feet of water per acre per year was necessary, (Retrial 22, 23, 48 and 75). The defendants called lVIr. Christensen as an expert. He testified that three acre feet per
acre would be necessary on the portions of the land which
had good soil (Retrial 95) and that more \Vater would
be necessary on the portions of the land which had sandy
soil, (Retrial 99). Defendants also sought to fix a 150
day irrigation season, (Retrial R. 113). We will have
occasion to refer to his testimony again under the argument on duty of water, but we note here that in the
court's original memorandum it accepted Mr. Christensen's testimony that 3 acre feet per acre was sufficient
water and then accepted Mr. Gardner's testimony on the
180 day irrigation season, (R. 51). By rotating the use
13
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of 'vater on ten day turns McNaughtons would be give11
eighteen irrigation turns per 180 day season. The court's
award of 3.5 acre feet of water per acre ( 42 i11ches per
acre) when divided into eighteen turns, would allow only
slightly more than two inches of water per irrigation
turn. Even if the crops could absorb 100 per cent of the
water applied to the land with no waste, this would not
mature crops. Therefore, in order to avoid an anomalous
result, we urge the court to either increase the amount
of water so that in each of the eighteen turns more water
could be applied, or in the alternative to shorten the
season, (R. 59). The court refused to increase the amount
above 3.5 acre feet, but did cut the length of the season.
The evidence shows that the 150 day turn will prove
too short. Gardner said that the growing season for corn
and alfalfa is 180 days, (Retrial R. 8). Defendants' witness Turner did not kno'v the growing season, (Retrial
R. 105). McNaughton testified that the season might in
some years begin as early as March on pasture land and
in some years continue as late as November, (Retrial
R. 110). Defendants' witness Hacking said the "frost
free'' period is generally between May and September,
but sometimes it is earlier, sometimes later, (Retrial R.
112). He said he begins to irrigate in the spring "when
we can get the water'' and it generally comes down about
the first of May, (Retrial R. 112). He irrigates until
October, (Retrial R. 113). On cross-examination he admitted that after dry 'vinters earlier irrigation might be
needed, (Retrial R. 117), and that they irrigate their
lawns about April 15th, (Retrial R. 117). He also· said
14
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there are seasons when it is beneficial to water the pastures until "the end of October", (Retrial R. 117) and
that a late irrigation of alfalfa is very desirable and
that this should be done after ''the frost is severe enough,
so that your growing season has stopped. '' (Retrial R.
117).
This is all the evidence on the length of the growing
season. Every witness testified that in some years water
is needed in April and some in March. Every witness
also saw value from irrigating in October.
The injunction issued has had the effect of awarding
all of the April and October water to the defendants,
whose lands are in the same 320 acre half section, as are
the plaintiffs. If plaintiffs do not need this early and
late water, neither do defendants, and plaintiffs should
not have been enjoined.
We thought at the trial and think now that it is
beneficial to irrigate the lands as late in the Fall as
water is available. Defendants apparently think so too,
because they definitely wanted the plaintiffs restricted
by injunction to a short irrigation season. But they
wanted to be free from any like restriction on their use
and strenuously objected to a finding that it was not beneficial to irrigate their lands before April 25th or after
September 22nd. Defendants have thus succeeded, without proving any water right, in limiting the plaintiffs to
a 150 day season, with an injunction which has the effect
of awarding defendants all of the waters of MeN a ugh ton
15
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Gulch between September 22nd and the follo,ving April
25th. They can have the plaintiffs punished for contempt,
even though plaintiffs are not interfering 'vith defendants or. their rights. This short season enforced by an
injunction, we believe is error.

POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN PLACING ANY
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS.
We consider it to be fundamental la-\v that no one
is entitled to have an injunction unless he can :first show
that he has a valid right ,,·hich will be interfered with
unless the injunction issues. It would be difficult to find
a principle of law more clearly established and so free
from conflict in the general authorities. In this case, the
plaintiffs after having told the court (Retrial R. 123)
defandants after having told the court (Retrial R. 123)
attempted to prove any water right at all, were granted
an injunction. They do not ask for an injunction in their
pleadings, (R. 8). The injunction entered did not simply
enjoin the plaintiffs from interfering with the defendants' rights, because defendants had not proved, and did
not even attempt to prove any rights. The injunction
was more general, making the plaintiffs subject to a
contempt citation if they use water beyond their rights.
There are two fundamental elements necessary to sustain an injunction, both of which are totally lacking here.
First, the defendants have not shown that they have any
right 'vhatsoever which needs to be protected by an injunction, and second, there is no showing that there will
be irreparable injury to the defendants if the plaintiffs

16
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use "\Vater in a manner different from that decreed. There
also is an affirmative injunction which orders the plaintiffs to install and maintain at their o'vn expense bypass
facilities past their various dams. The authorities leave
no doubt concerning the error of the court in this regard.
The subject is treated generally by numerous texts.
In 43 C.J.S. page 424 ff, the subject is generally discussed. It is noted in Section 15 that the power to issue
injunctions should be exercised "with great caution",
and only where the reason and necessity therefor are
"clearly established". Then in Section 19 it is stated:
''The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction; an injunction 'vill not issue to protect a right not in
esse and w·hich may never arise.''
In general text supporting the above statement it is
noted:
"Where it is clear
not have the right that
to an injunction either
prevent .a violation of

that the complainant does
he claims he is not entitled
temporary or perpetual to
such supposed right."

It is pointed out that injunctive relief is a ''remedy'' and
not in itself a cause of action, and that a cause of action
must always exist before injunctive relief can be granted.
See also Story's Equity Jurisprudence 1233.
The Utah Supreme Court, consistent with the above
rule, has always required that there be a right in the
nature of a property right owned by the complainant

17
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before equity will grant an injunction. For that matter,
the cases from all of the states are entirely in harmony
with the general text statements cited above. In Old
Telegraph Mining Company v. The Cen.tral Cement Company, 1 Utah 331, an action was sought to enjoin the
defendant from a trespass upon a certain mining claim.
The defense 'vas that the plaintiff did not own the claim.
Although there was no showing that the defendant owned
the claim, the court denied the injunction, stating:
"In order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief
asked 'vhere that relief is injunctive only, the title
of the plaintiff to the property said to be trespassed upon, must be clearly shown and be undisputed or steps taken to establish the title by
action at law, or valid and satisfactory reasons
be shown for not doing so.''
The rule was restated and applied in lJ!cGregor v.
Mining Compan.y, 14 Utah 47. Again the property involved was a mining claim. The court said:
''Ordinarily, this remedy by injunction will not
be exercised when the right of the complainant is
doubtful and has not been settled at law. Even
when it has been settled, an injunction will not
be granted 'vhen the remedy at la'v is adequate."
See also Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water and
Electric Power Company, 25 Utah 457, 71 P. 1069, in
which the court said :
I

"At common law a riparian owner below was
entitled to no redress against his neighbor above
for the use of water when no injury resulted * * ~~=
and ·in this regard there is no change under the
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law of appropriation. Indeed it would be contrary
to the universal sense of mankind to permit redress where there has been no wrong * * * so long
as his use is neither interfered with nor abridged,
an appropriator has no just cause to complain,
although another appropriator above him also
uses the same water for a beneficial use.''
In Dameron Valley Reservoir and Canal Company
v. Bleak, 61 Utah 230, 211 P. 974, plaintiff brought an
action to determine the respective rights of plaintiff and
defendant to certain waters. The court noted that both
parties had proved that they diverted some water from
the stream, but that the defendant had the prior right.
The court said :
''In Long on Irrigation in Section 113, the law
is stated thus:
'In order to entitle the claimant of a water
right to an injunction for damages in an action
for an alleged interference with his right, it
must, of course, appear that his right has been
invaded, and an injunction will not be granted
in such an action to restrain the defendant from
diverting the water of the stream in question
where it appears that the water diverted would
not have reached the plaintiff's land even if the
defendants had permitted it to flow in its natural
channel.' ''
In Stauffer v. Uta.h Oil Refining Compa;ny, 85 Utah
388, the plaintiff sought an injunction, complaining of
excessive use of certain artesian waters by the defendants. The court denied the injunction stating:
''Before plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction
or judgment for damages, they must establish by
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a preponderance of the evidence, that they are not
receiving the \Vater to \Yhich they are entitled, and
that the defendant by the acts complained of has
\vrongfully deprived them of such \Vater.''
The Utah Court in the Sta·uff er case, supra, cited a
California case (Hudson v. Dailey, 105 Pac. 784), with
approval. There the court had said that the plaintiff's
remedy would not be to enjoin the use of \Vater by defendant, but ''to have the respective rights of the parties
determined as riparian owners, and before plaintiffs
could have the aid of the court to enjoin the defendants'
use they would have to sho\v that use \Vas in excess of
their rights and resulted in the plaintiff's injury.''
The authorities from other states are to the same
effect. For example, in Ki·ng Cottnty v. Port of Seattle,
(Wash.) 203 P. (2d) 834, the court considered a petition
for an injunction to prevent a certain cab company from
getting the exclusive privilege to transport passengers.
The court said :
"It is incumbent upon one who seeks relief by
temporary or permanent injunction to show a
clear, equitable or legal title and a \Yell-grounded
fear of immediate invasion of that right. Furthermore, the actions complained of must establish an
actual and substantial injury or affirmative prospect thereof to the complainant.''
See also Jacobs v. An~erican Bank & TTust Company,
(Okla.) 68 .P. ( 2d) 801, involving an injunction to prevent
the defendant from selling certain lands claimed by plaintiff. After holding plaintiff had failed to establish title
to the land, the court said :
20
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"Plaintiff must have title to property or some
interest therein before an injunction \Vill be
granted at his instance to protect it. And he must
stand on the strength of his O\Vll title, rather than
on the \veakness of right and title claimed by his
opponents.''
It is respectfully submitted that in law no person is
entitled to an injunction except to protect a right which
is clearly established. Here the defendants have told the
court that they have proved no \Vater rights and that they
do not desire to try to prove any, (Retrial R. 123). Even
had they proved a right and sought an injunction they
would at the very most only be permitted injunctive relief
to protect those rights. They \vould not be entitled to
enjoin the plaintiffs from using public water or the
waters of third persons. Defendants ·could not have an
injunction except upon a sho\ving that the plaintiffs' use
would interfere with defendants' rights.
It may be asserted that the plaintiffs can not be
heard to complain if they are awarded everything to
which they are entitled. The answer is that an injunction
is extremely onerous and burdensome. Even \vith an
extremely stable stream, an injunction of this type would
be a burdensome thing. If plaintiffs' 92 hours and 24
minutes ends when he is occupied by other things, he
must nevertheless leave the things he might be doing and
go to the land and release the water to the defendants.
The injunction does not merely require plaintiffs not to
take defendants' water-it orders plaintiffs affirmatively
to release the water.

21
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On a fluctuating stream the problem is much more
acute. For example, plaintiffs may set their dams so aH
to take only the water allocated to them, but with the
stream varying in flow from day to day, because of upstream practices, plaintiffs may find themselves in contempt of court unless they stay in personal attendance
throughout the turn. A dam set to take t'vo cubic feet
of "\Vater from a stream "~ill certainly take more water
than two feet if the upstream irrigation practices cause
the stream to rise. With a fluctuating stream, the pro blem can not be handled by an automatic divider. When
the stream is low plaintiffs must put in a tight dam to
take all of the water in the stream. Even with a tight
dam, they will not get the two feet to which they are
entitled when the flow is of a negligible amount. Still
such a tight dam would place them in contempt of court
if the stream rose to two feet, or more, in their absence.
Thus on land of very low economic value the senior
appropriators, 'vho for fifty years have had the prior
right to use the "cater, nOY\r find themselves obligate~
either to set their dams so lo'v that even a rising stream
will not divert more than two cubic feet, thus giving them
less than 3.5 acre feet of 'vater per year, or they must set
their dams so that they will take exactly all of the water
up to two feet of water and then remain in constant
attendance for four days and nights so that the fluctuating stream 'vill never throw on to their lands more than
two c.f.s. of "\Vater.
If this were the only manner in which the defendants
could be protected, there would be more argument for
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it. But where as here the defendants have failed to prove
that they have any water right at all and have failed
even to suggest that such a rigid control on the plaintiff
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to the defendants, it is clearly error to place such onerous restrictions upon the plaintiffs.
It is doubtful that restrictions of this type could be
justified even had the defendants proved valid \\~nter
rights, because, first, the court has found and the evidence
shows that the stream is not measurable and that the
stream is fluctuating. In order to protect and assure to
the plaintiffs their rights on such a stream, they must
be given some latitude in the use of their \Vater. Second,
it is undisputed that l\IcN a ugh ton Gulch gains \Vater
throughout its length. Waters seep into the gulch helo\v
McNaughton's land and are available to the downstream
users, including the defendants. Had defendants been
required to prove the existence and extent of their rights,
almost certainly their rights \vould have been filled \Vithout in any way restricting MeN aughton during part of
each year. Third, it is physically impossible for defendants' lands to need water in March, April, October and
November, if the court is correct in its finding that J\icNaughtons do not. The lands are all \vithin a one-half
mile radius. They are on the same gulch; with a common
fence line. The irrigation season simply must be the same
for all the lands. IIow then can defendants possibly show
''irreparable harm'' to sustain an injunction from a use
of water by J\icNaughton before .A.pril 25th or after September 22nd ~ If none of the parties could use 'vater
23
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beneficially before April 25th or after September 22nd,
none of them could suffer ''irreparable harm'' from a
use of that water by another.
Nor in the absence of some showing that somebody
had a water right was it proper to order affirmatively
that l\icNaughton at his expense construct and maintain
by-pass facilities through his dams. The evidence is clear
that for 48 years and more McNaughton has maintained
tight dams across the MeN aughton Gulch. Now without
a showing that anyone else in the world has a right to
any gulch 'vater, or that these tight dams injure anyone,
McNaughton is ordered to go to the expense of constructing and maintaining by-pass facilities and will be in
contempt of court if he fails so to do.
r~rhe

net result of this injunction is to award to the
defendants (who did not "rant to prove any rights) all
of the "\Vater of l\1cNaughton Gulch not decreed to plaintiffs. Because plaintiffs are under an injunction, they
can not divert water until April 25th, regardless of need.
Thus, until April 25th all of the water in the gulch can
forever be used by these defendants to the exclusion of
the plaintiffs. The same is true after September 22nd.
It is "\Yell established under the water law of Utah
that anyone can use the public waters of the State prior
to the time they have been validly appropriated. (Deseret Livestock Co. v. Howells Livestock Co., 259 P. 2d
607.) If none of the defendants have appropriated the
water of McNaughton Gulch during the months of March,
April, October and November, (and the record fails to
24
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sho'v that they have), then the waters are insofar as this
record shows public \Vater and the ~IcNaughtons should
not have been enjoined from using them if in their judgment their lands needed water that early or late. The
law contemplates that they be free to use the water \vhich
otherwise would merely run to \Vaste. Some of the defendants' own witnesses testified that application of
water on alfalfa in the late fall S~flson, after the growing
season is stopped by frost, is beneficial to an alfalfa
crop, (Retrial 117). There \vas also testimony that the
use of water in the late season to wash alkaline salts
from the land is beneficial, (Retrial 22). Further, if the
waters accumulating in the gulch during the summer have
not been appropriated, McNaughton should be permitted
to use the water to suit his convenience. Also if use of
a larger irrigation head (a larger rate of flow) \vould
not interfere \Vith the rights of anyone, he should not
have been enjoined from using a larger head.
The ridiculous result which obtains from the trial
court's opinion leaves the senior appropriators so restricted in their use of the \Vater as to essentially deprive
them of the benefits of their appropriation, and destroys
their vested rights, while the defendants who have been
adjudicated to hold inferior rights, have been granted
an injunction which is tantamount to an award of all the
water in the gulch. This, even though they did not ask
for an injunction, and asserted to the trial court that
they had not attempted to prove any water rights and
that their water rights were not in issue. rrhe cases cited
above demonstrate that this injunction is fundamental
~nd prejudicial error.
25
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POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE
DUTY AT 3.5 ACRE FEE'l, P:B~R ACRE.
· The matter of duty of water is discussed extensively
by Wiel, '' \\T a.ter Rights in the Western States'', beginning at page 522. He points out that many states have
by statute provided minimums and maximums. Utah
has not done so. \Veil says that in the absence of statute,
the matter is not settled at any particular level, but
''In determining· the duty of water as applied
to the conditions in any particular case, evidence
should be from actual experiment and measurement, if possible. Opinion evidence is of less value
than experiment, as to which the head of water
influences its duty, the less the head, the greater
the quantity needed to spread it over the land,
and evidence should be as definite as possible.''
He then goes on to discuss various factors which affect
the duty, including loss in transmission, climate, soil
conditions, large losses by percolation beyond the reach
of plant roots, and the amount lost in necessary fluming.
The subject matter of duty of "rater is also extensively discussed in ''Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights'', beginning on page 1591. He lists various factors \vhich have been investigated by the Department of
Agriculture tending to solve the problems as to the
proper duty of water under all conditions. 2
2 (1) The quantity of water required by different crops; (2) The
length of the irrigation period in different sections of the arid and
semi-arid regions of the west; (3) The an1ount or divergence between
the quantity of water used in irrigation in the different months of the
growing season, and the rise and fall of streams during those months·
( 4) The benefits of reservoirs and the percentage of the total discharg~
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of streams which must be stored in order to utilize the whole supply;
( 5) Losses in canals from seepage and evaporation; ( 6) Influence of
different forms of water right contracts in promoting economy or
waste; ( 7) The return from the use in irrigation of an acre foot of
water; (8) The head of water and the quantity entering the intake.
He then proceeds with a discussion of the above itmns. He defines duty
as "the quantity essential to successfully irrigate a definite tract of
land."

He then says :
''The economical use of water might be carried
to the extent that no crops could be raised or at
least very poor crops. * * * But \vhere an appropriator has a prior right to ample \Vater to irrigate
properly a certain tract of land, the successful
raising of the crops thereon shottld not be made
to g,ive tuay by an award of a quantity of water
tuhich would require too great econ,omy in its use.
The object of these rules is to suppress, as far as
possible, the \Yaste of water, and an award of this
nature would be going to the other extreme and
uJould require an economy in tlze use of the water
at the expense of successful resttlts. The water
supply of the country should be conserved to the
greatest possible extent consistent with its successful use for all beneficial purposes for which
it may be appropriated. Further than this we
should not go.'' (Page 1394)
Kinney notes that no hard and fast rule can be made
as to the duty of water; that the proper duty can only
be determined from the facts surrounding each pa rticular case. What might be the proper quantity of water
for one tract might not be the proper quantity for an
another tract. Kinney has a very detailed discussion
of all the conditions which should be considered, and of
the wastage of water. He recognizes that economy in the
use of water might be carried to the extreme so as to
make the result ridiculous. We, of course, recognize
27
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that a sprinkling system would more efficiently use the
"\Vater than flooding the "\Vater, as is more commonly done.
vV e recognize that ditches have greater seepage loss than
pipelines; that levelland will take less 'vater than uneven
land; that irrigating with a large irrigation head will
permit more efficient use of the water than irrigating
with a small head; that using the water with storage
and equalizing reservoirs is more efficient than being
required to take the water as it comes; that an irrigator
in constant attendance can reduce excessive runoff on
the surface, etc. It is al,vays, therefore, important to
keep in mind the nature of the economic use. Certain
localities by their very nature do not justify irrigation
practices which might be justified by the irrigation of
row crops, a citrus orchard, or a hothouse.
The evidence is clear that the common method of
applying water in Ashley Valley is to divert in ditches
and apply the 'vater by flooding on to the land. In the
flooding of "\Vater upon the land, some waste is indispensable to reasonable results.

Utah Cases
The Utah Supreme Court is, of course, in harmony
with the theory that the duty of water must be determined in each individual case in accordance with the
particular facts of each case. For example, in Jackson
v. Spanish Fork & West Field Irrigation Comp·any, 223
P. (2d) 827, the Supreme Court approved the full-time
use of 1 c.f.s. on only 19 acres of land. In Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Company v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 274
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Pac. 474, the court approved four acre feet per acre
for irrigation purposes. In Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch,
76 Utah 356, 289 Pac. 1097, the court held that one cubic
foot of water to irrigate 10 acres of land was too high.
The closest Utah case to the one at bar from a fact
situation is Sharp v. Whitmore, 51 Utah 14, 168 Pac. 273.
rrhis was an action to quiet title to the \Yaters of Grassy
Trail Creek in Carbon County. Whitmore, \vho \\Tas held
to have the prior right, was the farthest upstream. A_fter
he irrigated his lands, vvaste waters returned by deep
percolation and surface runoff to the stream and became
available to the downstream users. The trial court found:
"That Grassy Trail C1·eek is a mountain
stream flowing through Sunnyside Canyon and
has a short, quick "Tatershed, and varies greatly
in its volume of flow, one yea.r tcith another, and
at di.ff erent ti1nes in the sa.me year, a.nd even upon
rliffere1lf days. That it is fed by mountain sno\v
and mountain storms and furnishes no constant
or uniform volume of flow or supply. That by
reason thereof no duty of \Vater extending through
the season can be fixed, as the stream becomes
entirely dry in the majority of years and the times
when water ceases to flo\v depends each year on
conditions as to precipitation and mountain
storms, and the court finds that for S'UCh rea.son
it is necessary that each of the appropriators a.s
he1·eto found use such quantity of 1taler in the
seasons of greatest .flou} of said creek as can be
beneficially spread upon said lands, and does find
that the quantity above mentioned can be beneficially used by each of said pa l'ties. * * * ''
The Supreme Court stated that there \Vere t\vo issues
on appeal, one of which was:
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''Did the court err in determining the duty of
water on the lands described in the pleadings* * * ''
Further reference to the trial court's findings discloses
that Whitmore had 125 acres of land. The trial court
allo,ved 4 cubic feet of water per second as a continuous
flow to irrigate that land . The Supreme Court increased
this to 5 c.f.s. ( 1 c.f.s. for each 25 acres). The Supreme
Court considered practically all of the factors mentioned
above by Kinney, that is, the nature of the crops, the
fluctuating stream, the nature of the soil, transmission
losses, where the return flow went after Whitmore used
it, etc. 3
3The court said:
"The evidence shows that the irrigated land ( 125 acres) * * *
extends along and on either side of Grassy Trail Creek a distance
of about one and one-half miles, and is divided into five fields. The
slope or fall of the land is toward the creek channel. * * * It is
conceded that 'Grassy Trail Creek is a natural stream of water
varying widely in the volume of its ftow one year to another and at
different times during the same season'. * * * The evidence without
conflict shows that the soil of the irrigated portions of the Whitmore Ranch is a sandy loam underlaid with sand and gravel and 'is
of a character that requires considerable water for proper inigation.' The evidence further shows that the waste water and some
seepage water from the irrigated lands ftows into the cheek channel.
Joseph R. Sharp, respondent, testified on this point in part, as
follows: 'More or less of the water that is used upon the Whitmore
Ranch during the high water season and during the inigation
season finds its ·way back into the channel of the stream by drainage
and seepage and comes into the channel before it reaches my place.
* * * There is no other place for it to go.' * * *
"Caleb Tanner, a civil engineer, was called by plaintiff and testified that he was on the Whitmore ranch five or six hours, and observed the character of the soil and the size of the diverting ditches;
that in his judgment 'each separate ditch would carry as much as
five cubic feet per second'; that, because of the loose and porous
condition of the soil the 'minimum head he would advise using on
the hay lands would be five second feet in order to get over the
territory.' * * *
"* * * The positive testimony of practical farmers who have
irrigated these lands for many years is to the effect that it requires
a continuous stream of five cubic feet per second during the highwater season, and all of the creek after the flow of high water
ceases to properly irrigate the lands to and including the month of
July."
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The trial court, basing its opinion on conflicting evidence, limited Whitmore to 4 cubic feet per second continuous flow. The Supreme Court increased this to 5
cubic feet per second and said:
''We are of the opinion that the greater and
overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that
a continuous fio'v of five cubic feet of water per
second during the irrigation season can be and
has been for many years economically applied on
the vVhitmore Ranch, and that this amount is
necessary to properly irrigate the land during
that period. The case is therefore remanded with
directions to the trial court to strike out the word
'four' and insert the word 'five' in its fourth
finding of fact * * * and decreeing Whitmore to
be the prior appropriator of, and entitled to divert, five cubic feet per second of the waters of
Grassy Trail Creek. '/.< * * ''
Justice Frick, in a special concurrence says :

'' * * * I have less hesitancy in arriving at the
foregoing conclusion, and in concurring in the
modification of the district court's findings and
decree, for the reason that the evidence leaves
no room for doubt that a large portion of the
water that is used on Whitmore's land immediately finds its way back into Grassy Trail Creek,
and thus becomes available to the plaintiffs whose
lands lie below Whitmore's lands. In modifying
the findings of fact and the decree, therefore, no
injustice ean possibly result to the plaintiffs, while
if Whitmore were limited to the use of four second
feet of \Vater only he might suffer irreparable
injury. While in my judgment, ordinarily, this
court should be slow to interfere \vith the findings
of fact and decrees of the trial courts in water
cases, yet when, as here, injury might result if
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the findings and decree were permitted to stand
and no injury can result by modifying them, as is
done in the opinion of Mr. Justiee McCarty, it, in
my judgment, becomes the duty of this court to
make the modification.''
In my opinion, the t\vo cases are a direct parallel in
the following particulars :
1. In both cases the stream varied in flow from year
to year, season to season, and day to day. See Findings
5 and 6 here and compare vfith Finding 9 on page 18 of
Volume 51, Utah Reports.
2. In both cases it is necessary to take the water
as it comes. In neither case was there any available
storage and as found by the District Court in the Sharp
case, because the stream flow varies, "it is necessary
that each of the appropriators * * * use such quantity
of water in the seasons of greatest flow of said creek as
can be beneficially spread upon the lands.''
3. In each case the drainage from the lands irrigated is back to the source. The evidence is not contradicted in this case that ~fcNaughton's lands lie along
either side of the gulch with the drainage back to the
gulch. Ex. 1 and A, Finding No. 10. 4
4Finding 10. "That at the lower end of this north gulch there is a
drain ditch which commences a few feet north of the north gulch and
extends across the east end of the MeN aughton property and empties
into the MeN a ugh ton Gulch; that the slope of the land is from the
north gulch to the MeN aughton Gulch, so that any water flowing into
said drain ditch will flow into the McNaughton Gulch; that the drain
ditch crosses over the most \vesterly ditch used by any of the defendants leading from their upper point of diversion and said drain ditch
empties the ·waters into the MeN aughton Gulch above all other points
of diversion of the defendants from the McNaughton Gulch." (R. 72)
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In the Sharp v. TVhitn~ore case, supra, it was this
particular factor which induced the Supreme Court to
increase the award from 4 to 5 c.f.s. As noted by Justice
Frick in his special concurrence, it could in no way prejudice the do,vnstream users if Whitmore were given too
much water, but would irreparably harm Whitmore if
he were given too little.
4. The next similarity bet,veen the Sharp v. Whitmore case and the case at bar is that the land is underlaid with sand and gravel in both cases, and both involved
sandy soil. Here there is a conflict as to the extent of
the sandy soil on lVIcNaughton's farm, but all of the
witnesses testified that at least part of the l\IcN a ugh ton
farm is sandy. Engineer Gardner classified practically
all of the McNaughton farm as being of sandy loam, (Retrial 25). Some of the defendants' witnesses testified
that certain areas were sandy and part clay, (Retrial 99).
There was no conflicting evidence as to the nature of the
subsoil. Gardner, the only witness who testified on this
point, testified that in the bottom of the gulch there is
a bed of gravel \vhich is causing the water to accumulate
in the gulch. He said that the gravel underlaying the
McNaughton farm is such that it would carry great
quantities of water back to the gulch, and because of this
he was of the opinion that the ground \Vater level \vould
not substantially increase even under heavy irrigation,
(Retrial 15).
5. The. court can take judicial kno,vledge of the
location of Grassy Trail Creek in the east end of Carbon
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County. The elevation is very similar to that of Vernal.
The area of Grassy Trail Creek is not very far removed
from the Vernal area, and certainly the climatic conditions are similar.
MeN aughton testified at the previous trial (R. 152
and 221) that by using all of the water accumulating in
the gulch he did not have sufficient water to irrigate his
land. Defendants' witness Hoeft said MeN aughton always kept a tight dam and used all the water, (R. 101).
Witness Lee testified that MeN a ugh ton used all of the
water accumulating in the gulch and still his land burned,
(R. 29). Because there has not been enough gulch water,
MeN aughton has always maintained some canal stock.
By releasing the water coming to him under his canal
stock, and commingling it with the waters of the gulch
he was able to get a large enough irrigation head and
enough water to permit efficient irrigation and also to
mature his crops. The Record stands without dispute
that McNaughton has consistently released his canal
water in order to permit him to water his lands adequately, (R. 152-3). He did have some canal stock, which
he rented, (R. 154) but he always reserved part of his
stock and the waters accumulating under it to supplement the waters from the gulch. We think that it is
conclusively established that during part of every normal
irrigation season MeN aughton is not able to get sufficient
water from the gulch to permit him to adequately irrigate
his place. If he is restricted to 92 hours each ten days
it is certain his lands will burn.
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We have the opinion of Engineer Gardner that the
~IcNaughton lands require 6 acre feet of water per acre.
The basis of his opinion showed that he did take into
consideration the factors which the Supreme Court has
said were important, (Retrial 20). Witness Christensen,
who also is an engineer, testified that in his opinion this
land could be efficiently irrigated with 3 acre feet per
acre on the clay parts, (Retrial 93), but that more would
be needed on the sandy parts, (Retrial 99). This witness
admitted that in all of Ashley Valley under the Ashley
Valley Upper Canal, an allowance of 3 acre feet per acre
from the canal is made and that when they kept records
it worked out that they got 3 acre feet per year, (Retrial
92). He also testified that reservoir stock was used to
bring the amount up to 3.2 c.f.s., (Retrial 93). He and
every other witness who testified on the matter confessed,
however, that this did not prove adequate in ordinary
years. Defendants' witness Lewis, who testified concerning his use age from the canal and reservoir stock at the
final hearing, stated unequivocally that the water right
thus provided was not adequate, (Retrial 87). Even Mr.
Christensen, who gave as his opinion that 3 acre feet
was enough, testified on page 259 of the record at the
former trial that the 3.2 acre feet was not enough. His
testimony was as follows:

"Q. Now when asked by Mr. Colton whether
or not the Ashley Valley Canal stock, one share
of it irrigated ten acres, you said it would during
the first part of the season. I ask you now, will it
during the late part of the season.
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A. I think the ans,Yer was it 'vould during the
first part of the season.
Q. Yes. N o"\V~ my question is, would it during
the late part of the season~

A. Ordinary years, no.''
Therefore, 'vhile the experts who have given their opinions vary somewhat, even the defendants' expert confesses that on the sandy soil more water would be necessary, and that 3.2 acre feet is not adequate in Ashley
Valley as a 'vhole during ordinary years.
Every single witness who testified on the subject,
whether for the defendants or for the plaintiffs, testified
that McNaughton for half a century maintained tight
dams in MeN a ugh ton Gulch and took all of the water
which accumulated therein, (R. 12, 15, 19, 63, 73, 100,
140). The trial court also so found, (R. 71). These dams
diverted out on to the l\1cN aught on lands all of the waters
accumulating in the Gulch. Not,vithstanding this, the
defendants' expert, Mr. Christensen, admitted that the
high spots on the McNaughton ground appeared to be
underirrigated, but that the lo'v spots were overirrigated,
(RetriallOO). This is in harmony with the testimony of
Gardner that in irrigating uneven land you must overirrigate the low spots to cause water to seep into the
high spots, (Retrial 10). With all the water running on
to his land McNaughton has testified that he has not had
enough water, (R. 152), and many witnesses testified,
and the defendants now contend that McNaughton has
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been compelled through shortage of water at his points
of diversion to supplement the gulch water with 'vater
diverted from the Ashley Canal under his canal stock,
(R. 29, 221, 101, 152). Still another independent witness
testified that with all the 'vater being diverted from the
gulch by tight dams, the NicN a ugh ton lands burn, (R. 29).
We have already detailed all of the evidence above showing the length of the irrigation season in Vernal and
under which every witness admitted that some irrigation
in early April and late October was beneficial.
In the face of this testimony the court has awarded
McNaughton the right to take the \Vater only four days
out of ten, thus giving him water only 40 per cent of the
time where for fifty years he had had the tight dams and
taken all the "\Vater all of the time. Further, during the
limited time that NicNaughton can take the water he
must never take more than two cubic feet per second.
Historically he has taken larger amounts when they were
available, because during parts of every day and every
season the flow varies and at low flow it goes do,vn to a
point where the quantity available is of a negligible
amount.
MeN a ugh ton thus, having proved a senior appropriation with 48 years of uninterrupted use of all the
water in the stream, has by restriction had nearly 80
per cent of the water he has historically used taken from
him. Historically he used the water in 1\. pril, October
and November. He is prohibited from using water dur37
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ing any of these months and during the last week in
September. So he has lost the early and late water and
has had the water totally taken from him six days out
of every ten during the summer. Further, during the
four days when he is permitted to use it he can never
take more than 2 c.f.s. It is, therefore, crystal clear that
nearly 80 per cent of the water he has historically used
has been taken from him by the court's order. Since
with 100% of the water going to his lands, he still found
it necessary to use canal water it seems clear that his
lands will burn from getting only 20% of the amount
he has historically used.
In the last analysis with his lands straddling the
Gulch and sloping to it and with a large drain ditch
at the lower-end of his land, it is impossible that he can
injure the defendants. Even had they proved a water
right, it is not possible for McNaughton to take from
the Gulch more water than his lands can retain. The
slope is to the Gulch and the drain ditch on the lower
end of his field returns any runoff to the gulch upstream
from any of the points of diversion used or claimed by
any of the defendants. By referring as we do to the
surface runoff, we do not imply that surplus water is
applied. In irrigation by flooding there must always be
some waste, and this waste water must in this case
return to the gulch. If the waste water ever were excessive McNaughton could not hold it from the defendants,
because Nature puts it back to the source. As the court
held in the Sharp case discussed above, there can be no
harm to the defendants from a duty fixed too high, but
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there will be irreparable harm to McNaughton if it IS
fixed too low.
POINT VI. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO PROTECT McNAUGHTON'S RIGHT TO
THE CANAL WATER AND TO FREE IT FROM
THE RESTRICTIONS.
The Supreme Court has already held that the waters
In McNaughton Gulch come there from five sources.
Three of the sources are public waters. The other two
are owned by MeN a ugh ton because they are in his control under previous appropriations. These last t'vo are
return flow to the gulch from his own irrigation and canal
water. The defendants have never contended, nor could
they, that they own any interest whatsoever in plaintiffs'
canal stock. The plaintiffs should be free to use their
water under the canal stock whenever the rules and
regulations of the canal will permit them so to do. There
should be no restriction as to water released by MeNa ughton from the canal. Also the restriction to two
cubic feet should not apply. If there were at any given
moment two feet of water in the gulch McNaughton
should be permitted to add his canal water to it to give
him a better irrigation head. We attempted to have the
trial court enter findings and conclusions which 'vould
free MeN a ugh ton's canal water from the restrictions and
to adjudicate that none of the defendants had any interest
in the canal water. The trial court erroneously struck
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these matters from the proposed findings, conclusions
and decree.

POINT VII. THE COURT ERRED IN CUTTING
DOWN THE IRRIGATED ACREAGE TO 66.03
ACRES.
As noted under Point I of our brief, the matters
previously determined by this court have become the
law of the case. T~e trial court found on the original
trial that all of MeN aughton's 80 acre tract was irrigated
except seven acres, (Finding 9, R. 13). The Supreme
Court said expressly that the water "\Vas used in 1903
about as it now is. When the defendants tried to introduce evidence relating to the question of irrigated acreage, I objected on the grounds that this matter had
already been settled by the trial court's previous :finding
"\vhich had been affirmed by this court, (Retrial 86).
This was argued at length before the trial judge and
then he sustained my objection refusing to permit the
parties on retrial to again examine the question of irrigatea acreage.
Then 'vithout notice to either party, the Judge on
his own motion reduced the irrigated acreage from 73,
as covered by his original finding 9, to 66.03. The Supreme Court has already found that the gulch was from
three to five rods wide-thus at its narrowest point it
is 50 feet wide and at its "\videst point it is 85 feet wide.
It is occupied in the bottom by a very small stream. The
approximately seven acres which lie within the gulch
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require water. The court noted in its original findings,
(Finding 11, R. 13) that the bottom of the gulch 'vas
filled with forage. Obviously the water to sustain this
growth must -come from seepage from irrigation of
upper lands. If the court cuts down the quantity of water
needed by these upper lands to their bare needs, then
the surplus which would run from said lands to irrigate
this seven acres within the gulch just will not be available.
The court has thus found that land of this character
needs 3.5 acre feet of water per year. It has found that
all of the land is arid by Nature, (Finding 13, R. 73). It
has then subtracted seven acres, because they are within
the gulch. Clearly these seven acres must be irrigated
from the runoff from the other lands. Yet in this manner
we have been deprived of water for seven acres of land.
We think this error is all the more obvious because
the trial court ruled on the retrial that he would not
reconsider his Finding No. 9 (Retrial 86) which related
to this matter of acreage. Plaintiffs had no warning
whatsoever that the court had reconsidered this matter.
There is no evidence whatsoever which will sustain the
finding of the court to the effect that the bottom of the
gulch does not need water and his findings are to the
contrary.
SUMMARY
By the various limitations as to season, quantity,
period of use, duty, etc., the district court has taken from
us nearly 80% of the water we have historically used.
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We respectfully submit that these restrictions must be
lifted and the duty increased and the rate of flow increased so that McNaughton who has had the senior
right for half a century will not have it taken from him
by junior appropriators who refused to prove any rights.
The injunction awarding the stream to the defendants
must be lifted until they prove a right which has been
or will be invaded causing them irreparable harm.
parable harm.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Appellants
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